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Abstract: 
There is a wide consensus among international institutions and national governments in favor of 
compact (i.e. densely populated) cities as a way to improve the ecological performance of the 
transport system. Indeed, when both the intercity and intra-urban distributions of activities are 
given, a higher population density makes cities more environmentally friendly as the average 
commuting length is reduced. However, when we account for the possible relocation of 
activities within and between cities in response to a higher population density, the latter may 
cease to hold. Because changes in population density affect land rents and wages, firms and 
workers re-optimize and choose new locations. We show that this may reshape the urban 
system in a way that generates both a higher level of pollution and welfare losses. As cities 
become more compact, agglomeration occurs and, eventually, the secondary business centers 
vanish. By increasing the average commuting length, these changes in the size and structure of 
cities may be detrimental to both the ecological and welfare objectives even if intercity trade 
flows decrease. This means that compact is not always desirable, and thus an increasing-density 
policy should be supplemented with instruments that impact the intra- and inter-urban 
distributions of activities. We argue that a policy promoting the creation of secondary business 
centers can raise welfare and decrease emissions. 
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Résumé:  
Il existe un large consensus parmi les institutions internationales et les gouvernements 
nationaux en faveur des villes compactes (c’est-à-dire densément peuplées) comme un moyen 
d’améliorer la performance écologique de nos systèmes de transport. En effet, lorsque la 
localisation des activités demeure inchangée, une forte densité de population rend les villes plus 
respectueuses de l’environnement car la longueur du trajet moyen est réduite. Cependant, les 
effets à long terme sont incertains dans la mesure où la localisation des activités au sein et entre 
les villes s’ajuste en réponse à une forte densité de population. En effet, le changement de 
densité de population, en affectant les rentes foncières et les salaires, modifie la localisation des 
entreprises et des travailleurs, et donc la demande de transport. Nous montrons que la 
densification des villes peut remodeler le système urbain d’une manière qui détériore la 
situation environnementale et le bien-être. Des villes plus compacts accroissent la 
concentration spatiale et, éventuellement, réduisent la taille des pôles d’emploi secondaires. En 
augmentant la longueur de trajet en moyenne, ces changements dans la taille et la structure des 
villes peuvent être préjudiciables pour l’environnement et le bien-être, même si le commerce 
interurbain de marchandises diminue. Nous soutenons qu’une politique de promotion de la 
création de pôles d’emploi secondaires peut augmenter le bien-être et diminuer la pollution liée 
au transport. 
 
Mots clés: Gaz à effet de serre, transport de marchandises, déplacement domicile/travail, villes 
compactes 
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1 Introduction
According to Yvo de Boer, former Executive Secretary of the United Nations, Given the
role that transport plays in causing greenhouse gas emissions, any serious action on climate
change will zoom in on the transport sector(speech to the Ministerial Conference on Global
Environment and Energy in Transport, January 15, 2009). The transport sector is indeed a large
and growing emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG). It accounts for 30% of total GHG emissions
in the US and approximately 20% of GHG emissions in the EU-15 (OECD, 2008). Within the
EU-27, GHG emissions in the transport sector have increased by 28% over the period 1990-
2006, whereas the average reduction of emissions across all sectors is 3%. Moreover, road-based
transport accounts for a very large share of GHG emissions generated by the transport sector.
For example, in the US, nearly 60% of GHG emissions stem from gasoline consumption for
private vehicle use, while a share of 20% is attributed to freight trucks, with an increase of 75%
from 1990 to 2006 (Environmental Protection Agency, 2011).1
Although new technological solutions for some transport modes might allow for substantial
reductions in GHG emissions (Kahn and Schwartz, 2008), improvements in energy e¢ ciency
are likely to be insu¢ cient to stabilize the pollution level in the transport sector (European
Environment Agency, 2007). Thus, other initiatives are needed, such as mitigation policies
based on the reduction of average distances travelled by people and commodities. To a large
extent, this explains the remarkable consensus among international institutions as well as local
and national governments to foster the development of compact (or densely populated) cities
as a way of reducing the ecological impact of cities and contributing to sustainable urban
development. Nevertheless, the analysis of global warming and climate change neglects the
spatial organization of the economy as a whole and, therefore, its impact on transport demand
and the resulting GHG emissions. It is our contention that such neglect is unwarranted.
A large body of empirical literature highlights the e¤ect of city size and structure on GHG
emissions through the level of commuting (Bento et al., 2006; Kahn, 2006; Brownstone and
Golob, 2009; Glaeser and Kahn, 2010). The current trend toward increased vehicle use has
been reinforced by urban sprawl, as suburbanites trips between residences and workplaces
have increased (Brueckner, 2000; Glaeser and Kahn, 2004). Kahn (2006) reports that the
predicted gasoline consumption for a representative household is lowest in relatively compact
cities such as New York and San Francisco and is highest in sprawling cities such as Atlanta
and Houston. While the environmental costs of urban sprawl are increasingly investigated in
North America, the issue is becoming important in Europe as well. For example, between 1986
1This increase is associated with an increase in the average distance per shipment. In France, from 1975 à
1995, the average kilometers per shipment has increased by 38% for all transportation modes, and by 71% for
road transport only (Savin, 2000). Similar evolutions have been observed in the richer EU countries and in the
USA.
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and 1996 in the metropolitan area of Barcelona, the level of per capita emissions doubled, the
average trip distance increased by 45%, and the proportion of trips made by car increased by
62% (Muniz and Galindo, 2005). Recognizing the environmental cost of urban sprawl, scholars
and city planners alike advocate city compactness as an ideal.2
Starting from the prevailing view that more compact cities is the proper way to contain
GHG emissions, our paper addresses the following two issues. Firstly, when assessing the
merits of increasing-density policies, the existing literature disregards one major problem: a
higher population density may spark the relocation of rms and households. Instead, a full-
edged analysis of such a policy should be conducted within a framework in which rms and
householdslocations are endogenously chosen in response to a higher population density. When
its e¤ects on the spatial distribution of rms and households are ignored, the environmental
impact of an increasing-density policy is always positive because people commute over shorter
distance. However, such a policy a¤ects prices, wages and land rents, which lead rms and
households to change places in order to re-optimize prots and utility. Accounting for these
spatial e¤ects makes the impact of higher urban density more ambiguous because their net
e¤ects depend on whether the new spatial pattern is better or worse from the environmental
viewpoint.
Secondly, once it is recognized that the desirability of increasing-density policies depends
on the resulting spatial pattern, another question comes to mind: which spatial distribution
of rms/households minimizes transport-related GHG emissions in the space-economy as a
whole? Transporting people and commodities involves environmental costs which are associated
with the following fundamental trade-o¤: concentrating people and rms in a reduced number
of large cities minimizes pollution generates by commodity shipping among urban areas but
increases pollution stemming from a longer average commuting; dispersing people and rms
across numerous small cities has the opposite e¤ects. Therefore a sound environmental policy
should be based upon the ecological assessment of the entire urban system. Although seemingly
intuitive, this global approach has not been part of the debate on the desirability of compact
cities.
That said, the above trade-o¤also has a monetary side, and thus an increasing-density policy
has welfare implications that are often overlooked by compact citiesproponents. This should
not come as a surprise because transporting people and commodities involves both economic
and ecological costs. In other words, there is a tight connection between the ecological and
welfare objectives. According to Stern (2008), the emissions of GHG are the biggest market
failure that the public authorities have to manage. It is, therefore, tempting to argue that
deadweight losses associated with market imperfections are of second order. This view is too
extreme because a higher population density impacts the consumption of all goods, and thus
2See Dantzig and Saaty (1973) for an old but sound discussion of the advantages of compact cities. Gordon
and Richardson (1997) provide a critical appraisal of this idea
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changes individual welfare. Having this in mind, we show that increasing density may generate
welfare losses when the urban system shifts from dispersion to agglomeration. For this reason,
our paper focuses on both the ecological and welfare e¤ects of a higher population density when
rms and households are free to relocate between and within cities.
In doing so, we consider the following two urban scenarios. In the rst one, cities are
monocentric while consumers and rms are free to relocate between cities in response to a higher
population density. We show that an increasing-density policy may generate a hike in global
pollution when this policy leads the urban economy to shift from dispersion to agglomeration, or
vice versa. For example, when both the initial population density and the unit commuting cost
are low enough, an increasing-density policy incentivizes consumers and rms to concentrate
within a single city. However, at this new spatial pattern, the density may remain su¢ ciently
low for a single large city to be associated with a longer average commuting, which generates
more pollutants than two small cities. Conversely, when the unit commuting cost is high, the
market leads to the dispersion of activities because consumers aim to bear lower land rent
and commuting costs. Yet, when the density gets su¢ ciently high, the average commuting is
short enough for the agglomeration to be ecologically desirable because intercity transport ows
vanish. Consequently, agglomeration or dispersion is not by itself the most preferable pattern
from the ecological point of view. In other words, our results question the commonly held belief
of many urban planners and policy-makers that more compact cities are always desirable. They
also show that one should pay more attention to the e¤ect of increasing-density policies on city
size.
In the second scenario, we study the ecological and welfare impact of an increasing-density
policy when both the city size and morphology are endogenously determined. By inducing high
urban costs, a low population density leads to both the dispersion and decentralization of jobs,
that is, the emergence of polycentric cities. If urban planners make the urban system more
compact (i.e. raise population density), then, the secondary business centers shrink smoothly
and, eventually, rms and households produce and reside in a single monocentric city. We
show that these changes in the size and structure of cities may generate higher emissions from
commuting. Thus, an increasing-density policy should be supplemented with instruments that
inuence the intra- and inter-urban distributions of households and rms. In particular, we
argue that a decentralization of jobs within cities, that is, a policy promoting the creation of
secondary business centers, both raises welfare and decreases GHG emissions.
In what follows, we assume that the planner chooses the same population density in all
cities. Alternately, we could assume that city governments noncooperatively choose their own
population density. Both approaches have merits that are likely to suit countries with di¤erent
attitudes regarding major issues such as the development of more densely populated cities. Our
main argument is that the planning outcome is typically used by economists when assessing
the costs and benets of a particular policy.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a model
with two monocentric cities and discuss the main factors a¤ecting the ecological performance
of an urban system. While we acknowledge that our model uses specic functional forms, these
forms are standard in economic theory and are known to generate results that are fairly robust
against alternative specications. Note also that using specic forms is not a serious issue as
the main objective of the paper is not to prove a particular result, but to highlight the possible
ambiguity of the desirability of more compact cities. Section 3 focuses on monocentric cities
and presents the ecological and welfare assessment of an increasing-density policy. In Section
4, we extend our analysis to the more general case in which both the internal structure of cities
and the intercity distribution of activities are determined endogenously by the market. The
last section o¤ers our conclusions.
2 The model
Consider an economy endowed with L > 0 mobile consumers/workers, two cities where city r =
1; 2 hosts Lr consumers (with L1+L2 = L), one manufacturing sector, and three primary goods:
labor, land, and the numéraire which is traded costlessly between the two cities. Cities are
assumed to be anchored and separated by a given physical distance. In order to disentangle the
various e¤ects at work, it is convenient to distinguish between two cases: in the former, workers
are immobile, i.e. Lr is exogenous; in the latter, workers are mobile, i.e. Lr is endogenous. In
this section, we describe the economy for a given distribution of workers between cities.
2.1 The city
Each city, which is formally described by a one-dimensional space, can accommodate rms and
workers. Whenever a city is formed, it is monocentric with a central business district (CBD)
located at x = 0 where city r-rms are set up.3 Without loss of generality, we focus on the right-
hand side of the city, the left-hand side being perfectly symmetrical. Distances and locations
are expressed by the same variable x measured from the CBD. Our purpose being to highlight
the interactions between the transport sector and the location of activities, we assume that the
supply of natural amenities is the same in both cities.
We assume that the lot size is xed and normalized to 1. Our policy instrument is given
by the tallness (i.e. the number of oors)  > 0 of buildings. As a consequence, the parameter
, which measures the citys compactness, is also the population density. Because  is constant
the population is uniformly distributed across the city. Although technically convenient, the
assumption of a common and xed lot size does not agree with empirical evidence: individual
plots tend to be smaller in large cities than in small cities. Since the average commuting is
3See Duranton and Puga (2004) for a survey of the reasons explaining the emergence of a CBD.
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typically longer in large than in small cities, we nd it natural to believe that the plot size
e¤ect is dominated by the population size e¤ect. Moreover, we test the robustness of our
results in the case of nonuniform but given densities.
Because  consumers are located at each point x, the right endpoint of the city is given by
yr =
Lr
2
which increases (decreases) with population size (density).
2.2 Preferences and prices
Although new economic geography typically focuses on trade in di¤erentiated products, it is
convenient to assume that manufacturing rms are Cournot competitors producing a homoge-
neous good under increasing returns.4 Location matters because transport costs are associated
with the shipping of the manufactured good between cities. Thus each citys market may be
served by local rms that produce domestically as well as by rms established in the other city.
In this context, there is cross-hauling and the benets from consuming more varieties, which
are central to standard new economic geography models, are replaced by those generated by
lower prices stemming from strategic competition between quantity-setting rms (Brander and
Krugman, 1983).
Because the manufactured good is homogeneous, the quadratic utility proposed by Otta-
viano et al. (2002) becomes
maxUr =

a  qr
2

qr + q0 (1)
where qr is the consumption of the manufactured good and q0 the consumption of the numéraire.
The unit of the manufactured good is chosen for a = 1 to hold. Each worker is endowed with
one unit of labor and q0 > 0 units of the numéraire. The initial endowment q0 is supposed
to be large enough for the individual consumption of the numéraire to be strictly positive at
the equilibrium outcome. Each individual works at the CBD and bears a unit commuting cost
given by t > 0, which implies that the commuting cost of a worker located at x > 0 is equal to
tx units of the numéraire. Note that the lot size does not enter the utility because it is constant
throughout our analysis.
The budget constraint of a worker residing at x in city r is given by
qrpr + q0 +Rr(x)= + tx = wr + q0 (2)
where pr is the price of the manufactured good and wr the wage paid by rms in city rs CBD.
In this expression, Rr(x) the land rent at x, and thus Rr(x)= is the price paid by a consumer
4The same modeling strategy is used, among others, by Gaigné and Wooton (2011), Hauer and Wooton
(2010), and Thisse (2010).
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to reside at x. Within each city, a worker chooses her location so as to maximize her utility (1)
under the budget constraint (2).5
Utility maximization leads to the individual inverse demand for the manufactured good
pr = max f1 Qr=Lr; 0g (3)
where Qr is the total quantity of the manufactured good sold in city r.
Because of the xed lot size assumption, the equilibrium value of urban costs, dened as the
sum of commuting costs and land rent, is the same across workerslocations. The opportunity
cost of land being normalized to zero, the equilibrium land rent is then given by
Rr(x) = t

Lr
2
  x

for x < yr: (4)
Let n denote the number of operating rms and nr the number of rms located in city r.
To operate, a rm needs a xed amount of labor f > 0 and m units of labor to produce one
unit of the good. The unit of labor is chosen for f = 1. Moreover, the inverse demand functions
being linear, we may normalize m to zero without loss of generality.
The manufactured good is shipped between cities at the cost of  > 0 units of the numéraire.
Because they are spatially separated, the two markets are segmented (Engel and Rogers, 1996,
2001). This means that each rm chooses a specic quantity to be sold on each market; let qrs
be the quantity of the manufactured good that a city r-rm sells in city s = 1; 2.
The prots of a city r-rm are given by r = r   wr where operating prots are dened
by
r = qrrpr + qrs (ps   ) with s 6= r (5)
while wr denotes the wage rate in city r (recall that rms use one unit of labor). Firms compete
in quantity. Therefore, using (3) and Qr = nrqrr + nsqsr, the equilibrium quantities sold by a
city r-rm are given by qrr = Lrp

r and q

rs = Ls (p

s   ). Substituting qrr and qsr into Qr and
the resulting expression in the inverse demand function, we obtain the following equilibrium
prices:
pr =
1 + (n  nr)
n+ 1
(6)
which decreases with the number of domestic rms.
Last, inserting (6) in qrr and q

rs yields a rms sales in each city:
qrr = Lr
1 + (n  nr)
n+ 1
qrs = Ls
1   (1 + ns)
n+ 1
: (7)
Observe that a rm exports more when transport costs decreases whereas its domestic sales
decrease because competition from foreign rms in tougher. Moreover, trade between cities
arises regardless of the intercity distribution of rms if and only if
 <  trade  1
n+ 1
< 1 (8)
5For simplicity, we assume that land is owned by absentee landlords.
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a condition which we assume to hold throughout the paper.
Urban labor markets are local. Labor market clearing implies
Lr = nr (9)
with nr + ns = n. The equilibrium city r-wage is determined by the zero-prot condition.
In other words, the operating prots evaluated at the equilibrium prices and quantities are
completely absorbed by the wage bill and no rm can protably enter the market. Formally,
this means that the equilibrium wages are determined by the conditions r(wr; ws) = 0 and
s(wr; ws) = 0. Substituting (6) and (7) in (5), we get the equilibrium wages
wr =
Lr [1 + (L  Lr)]2
(L+ 1)2
+
Ls [1   (1 + Ls)]2
(L+ 1)2
(10)
where r; s = 1; 2 and s 6= r. To sum up, (9) and (10) characterize labor market clearing in each
city.
The indirect utility of a city r-worker is
Vr = S

r + w

r   UCr + q0 (11)
where Sr is the consumer surplus evaluated at the equilibrium prices (6):
Sr =
(L  Ls)2
2 (L+ 1)2
(12)
while UCr are the urban costs borne by a city r-worker, dened as the sum of land rent and
commuting costs. It follows immediately from (4) that
UCr = tLr=2:
Hence, for a given intercity distribution of workers, increasing urban population density through
taller buildings leads to a higher individual welfare because urban costs are lowered.
2.3 The ecological trade-o¤ in a space-economy
As mentioned in the introduction, goodsshipping and work-trips are the two main sources
of GHG emissions generated in the transport sector. To convey our message in a simple way,
the carbon footprint (E) of the urban system is obtained from the total distance travelled by
commuters within cities (C) and from the total quantity of the manufactured good shipped
between cities (T ):
E = eCC + eTT (13)
where eC is the amount of carbon dioxides generated by one unit of distance travelled by a
worker, while shipping one unit of the manufactured good between cities generates eT units
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of carbon dioxides. The value of eC depends on the technology used (fuel less intensive and
non-fuel vehicles, eco-driving and cycling) and on the commuting mode (public transportation
versus individual cars). As for the value of eT , it primarily depends on the distance between the
two cities and the transport mode (road freight versus rail freight), but also on the technology
(e.g. truck size) and the transport organization (empty running, deliveries made at night, ...).
For simplicity, we assume that eC and eT are given parameters which are independent from
city size and compactness. Admittedly, these are strong assumptions. First, because collective
forms of transport are more viable in larger and/or more compact cities, one would expect eC to
be a decreasing function of city size and/or compactness. Under these circumstances, intercity
migrations increases the value of eC in the origin city but leads to a lower eC in the destination
city. As a result, the global impact of migration would depend on a second-order e¤ect which
is hard to assess. In what follows, we treat eC as a parameter and will discuss what our results
become when eC varies.
Denote by  the share of workers (rms) residing (producing) in city 1. In equilibrium,
consumers/workers are symmetrically distributed on each side of the CBD. Conditional upon
this pattern, the value of C depends on the intercity distribution of the manufacturing sector
and is given by
C() = 2
Z y1
0
xdx+ 2
Z y2
0
xdx =
L2
4
[2 + (1  )2]: (14)
Clearly, the emission of carbon dioxides stemming from commuting increases with  for all
 > 1=2 and is minimized when workers are evenly dispersed between two cities ( = 1=2). In
addition, for any given intercity distribution of activities, the total amount of emission decreases
with the population density because the distance travelled by each worker shrinks. Observe
that C is independent of t when  is xed because the demand for commuting is perfectly
inelastic.
Regarding the value of T , it is given by the sum of equilibrium trade ows, n1q12 + n2q

21.
Using (7) and (9), we have
T () =
[2  (L+ 2)]L2
L+ 1
 (1  ) (15)
where, owing to (8), T > 0. As expected, T is minimized when workers and rms are agglomer-
ated within a single city ( = 0 or 1) and maximized when  = 1=2. Note also that T increases
when shipping goods becomes cheaper because intercity trade grows. Hence, transport policies
that foster lower trading costs give rise to a larger emission of GHG.
The ecological trade-o¤we want to study may then be stated as follows: a more agglomerated
pattern of activity reduces pollution arising from commodity intercity shipping, but increases the
GHG emissions stemming from a longer average commuting; and vice versa.
We acknowledge with Glaeser and Kahn (2010) that most car trips, at least in the US, are
not commuting trips. Car trips are also made for shopping as well as for some other activities.
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Likewise, the objective function E could be augmented by introducing emissions stemming
from the production of the manufactured good. As shown in Appendix A, accounting for these
additional sources of emissions does not a¤ect our results because their analytical expression
behaves like C. We could similarly take into account the distribution of goods within metropol-
itan areas, which depends on both the city size and the consumption level. For example, the US
commodity ows survey reports that more than 50% of commodities (in volume) are shipped
over a distance less than 50 miles (US Census Bureau, 2007). In a nutshell, accounting for
the emission of GHG stemming from additional sources such as shopping trips, production and
intra-city goods transport makes the case for dispersion stronger.
3 City size and the environment
In this section, we determine the market outcome and study the ecological desirability of an
increasing population density when workers and rms are free to relocate between cities.
3.1 The market outcome
As in the core-periphery model, rms and workers move hand-in-hand, which means that
workersmigration drives rmsmobility. A long-run equilibrium is reached when no worker,
hence rm, has an incentive to move. It arises at 0 <  < 1 when the utility di¤erential
between the two cities V ()  V1()   V2() = 0, or at  = 1 when V (1)  0. An
interior equilibrium is stable if and only if the slope of the indirect utility di¤erential V is
strictly negative in a neighborhood of the equilibrium, i.e., dV=d < 0 at ; an agglomerated
equilibrium is stable whenever it exists.
Using (11), the utility di¤erential is given by (up to a positive and constant factor):
V () / (   m)

  1
2

(16)
where
m  t
("a   "b) > 0
and "a  2 (2 + 3L) = (L+ 1)2 > 0 and "b  (L + 2)(2L + 1)= (L+ 1)2 > 0. Clearly, ("a  
"b) is positive and increasing with respect to  because  trade < "a=2"b. Consequently, the
agglomeration of rms and workers within one monocentric city is the only stable equilibrium
when  > m. In contrast, if  < m, dispersion with two identical monocentric cities is the
unique stable equilibrium.
To sum up, we have:
Proposition 1 Workers and rms are agglomerated into a monocentric city when population
density is high, commuting costs are low, and transport costs are high. Otherwise, they are
evenly dispersed between cities.
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3.2 Minimizing the ecological footprint
Because E is described by a concave or convex parabola in , the emission of GHG is minimized
either at  = 1 or at  = 1=2. Thus, it is su¢ cient to evaluate the sign of E(1) E(1=2). It is
readily veried that the agglomeration (dispersion) of activities is ecologically desirable if and
only if  > e ( < e) with
e  eC
2eT
L+ 1
2  (L+ 2) :
Because de=d > 0 and de=dL > 0, we have:
Proposition 2 Assume that cities are monocentric. Pollution stemming from commuting and
shipping is minimized under agglomeration (dispersion) when population density is high (low),
transport costs are low (high), or the total population is low (high).
Hence, agglomeration or dispersion is not by itself the most preferable pattern from the
ecological point of view. A compact city is ecologically desirable only if the population density
is su¢ ciently high for the average commuting distance to be small enough. But what do high
and smallmean? The answer depends on the structural parameters of the economy that
determine the value of the threshold e. Indeed, e increases with eC but decreases with eT .
In addition, the adoption of commuting modes with high environmental performance (low eC)
decreases the density threshold value above which agglomeration is ecologically desirable, while
transport modes for commodities with high environmental performance (low eT ) increases this
threshold value.
Our framework also sheds light on the e¤ects of a carbon tax levied on the transport of
commodities. The implementation of such a tax is formally equivalent to a rise in transport
costs (). For any intercity distribution of rms, increasing transport costs reduce pollution
(see (15)). However, raising transport costs fosters agglomeration (because m decreases), while
this spatial conguration tends to become ecologically less desirable (because e increases).
Therefore, the evaluation of a carbon tax should not focus only upon price signals. It should
also account for its impact on the spatial pattern of activities. Finally, observe that e is
independent of t. Nevertheless, as shown by Proposition 1, the value of t impacts on the
interregional market pattern, thus on the ecological outcome.
3.3 Are more compact cities desirable?
(i) The ecological viewpoint. We determine the conditions under which the market yields
a good or a bad outcome from the ecological viewpoint. Because m = 0 at t = 0 and increases
with t, while e is independent of t, there are four possible cases, which are depicted in Figure
1. In panels A and C, the market outcome minimizes pollution. In contrast, in panels B and D,
the market delivers a conguration that maximizes the emissions of GHG. Consequently, the
market may yield as well as the best or the worst ecological outcome.
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Insert Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 shows that there exists a unique t such that
m T e i¤ t T t:
Consider rst the case where t > t (see Figure 2a). If  < m, the market outcome
involves two cities. Keeping this conguration unchanged, a higher value of  always reduces
the emissions of pollutants. Note, however, that lower levels of GHG emissions could be reached
under agglomeration for  2 [e; m]. Once  exceeds m, the economy gets agglomerated, thus
leading to a downward jump in the GHG emissions. Further increases in  yield lower emissions
of GHG. Hence, when commuting costs are high enough, denser cities generate lower emissions
of GHG.
Assume now that t < t (see Figure 2b). As in the foregoing, provided that  < m,
the market outcome involves dispersion while the pollution level decreases when the cities get
more compact. When  crosses m from below, the pollution now displays an upward jump.
Under dispersion, however, lower levels of GHG emissions would have been sustainable over
[m; e]. In other words, more compact cities need not be ecologically desirable because this
recommendation neglects the fact that it may trigger interurban migrations. Consequently, once
it is recognized that workers and rms are mobile, what matters for the total emission of GHG
is the mix between the urban compactness () and the interregional pattern (). This has
the following major implication: environmental policies should focus on the urban system as a
whole and not on individual cities.
Insert Figures 2a and 2b about here
The foregoing discussion shows how di¢ cult it is in practice to nd the optimal mix of
instruments. Our model also allows us to derive some unsuspected results regarding the ability
of instruments other than regulating the population density (carbon tax, low emission transport
technology, ...) to reduce pollution. For example, when t < t the development of more ecological
technologies in shipping goods between cities (low eT ) combined with the implementation of a
carbon tax on carriers, which causes higher transport costs (high ), lead to a higher value of
e and a lower value of m. This makes the interval [m; e] wider, while the value of t increases.
Hence, the above policy mix, which seems a priori desirable, may exacerbate the discrepancy
between the market outcome and the ecological optimum. Therefore, when combining di¤erent
environmental policies, one must account for their impacts on the location of economic activities.
Otherwise, they may result in a higher level of GHG emissions.
The conventional wisdom is that population growth is a key driver in damaging the envi-
ronmental quality of cities. Restraining population growth is, therefore, often seen as a key
instrument for reducing pollution. Indeed, for a given intercity pattern and a given density
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level, dEm=dL > 0 because a bigger population generates larger trade ows and longer com-
muting. Nevertheless, because rms and workers are mobile, a population hike may change the
intercity pattern of the economy. For that, we must study how the corresponding increase in
population size a¤ects the greenness of the economy. In our setting, increasing L has the fol-
lowing two consequences. First, it raises the density threshold level (de=dL > 0) above which
agglomeration is the ecological optimum. Second, dispersion becomes the market equilibrium
for a larger range of density levels (dm=dL > 0). What matters for our purpose is how the
four domains in Figure 1 are a¤ected by a population hike.
When t increases with L, then m e decreases with L provided that t > t, whereas e m
increases when t < t. In this event, urban population growth decreases the occurrence of a
conict between the market and the ecological objective when commuting costs are high enough
(see Figure 2a) but makes bigger the domain over which the market outcome is ecologically bad
(see Figure 2b). When t decreases with L, the opposite holds. In both cases, as already noted
by Kahn (2006) in a di¤erent context, there is no univocal relationship between urban population
growth and the level of pollution. Our analysis provides a rationale for the non-monotonicity of
the relationship observed between these two magnitudes.
To sum up,
Proposition 3 Assume that cities are monocentric. If commuting costs are high, making cities
more compact reduces pollution when the economy shifts from dispersion to agglomeration.
However, when commuting costs are low, an increasing-density policy may be detrimental from
the ecological viewpoint.
The assumption of a constant population density is very restrictive. At the same time, it is
well known that characterizing the market outcome with an endogenous determination of the
population density in NEG-type models is a formidable task, which has been so far out of reach
(Tabuchi, 1998). We want to take an intermediate approach in which the density is variable
but exogenous. More precisely, we assume that the population density is now given by f(x)
where f(x) is a strictly decreasing function of the distance x to the CBD. In this case, a third
spatial conguration spatial may emerge: the market outcome and the ecological optimum may
involve a large and a small monocentric city when commuting costs take on intermediate values.
However, as in the case of a uniform distribution of population density, increasing  leads to
lower land rents, which pushes toward a more concentrated pattern of activities and a higher
value of the total distance travelled by commuters. Though the analytical details become much
more cumbersome, Proposition 3 remains true. An example is explicitly dealt with in Appendix
B.
(ii) The welfare viewpoint. As seen in the introduction, transporting people and com-
modities involves economic and ecological costs. It is not clear, however, what the welfare
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implications of a higher population density are because the market outcome and the solution
minimizing the ecological footprint involve di¤erent consumption levels of the manufactured
good and of the numéraire. Therefore, it is important to gure out how social welfare is
a¤ected by changing the population density level.
For a given intercity distribution of activities, a higher population density is always welfare-
enhancing because the average commuting costs are lower. However, when the population
density becomes su¢ ciently high, rms and workers get agglomerated. In addition to increasing
urban costs, this change in the spatial pattern has two e¤ects on the utility level. First, it leads
to a wage e¤ect which is ambiguous. Indeed, agglomeration triggers ercer competition and
lowers the domestic price, which tends to reduce prots. Simultaneously, rms supply all
consumers at a lower cost, thus leading to an output hike which tends to increase prots.6
Second, as the negative e¤ect of transport costs on consumption vanish, the consumer surplus
increases (12). The total impact of denser cities on social welfare is, therefore, unclear. As
a consequence, we must assess how the socially optimum conguration is a¤ected by a higher
population density. Because we study the environmental gains or losses associated with the
market outcome, we nd it natural to adopt a second-best approach in which the planner
controls the location of rms and workers but not their production and consumption decisions.
Because utilities are quasi-linear and prots are wiped out by free entry, social welfare may
be dened by the sum of indirect utilities evaluated at the equilibrium prices and incomes. In
what follows, we have chosen to focus on welfare without accounting for the negative impact
of pollution because weighting this externality in the social welfare function is often arbitrary.
For the same reason, we do not include the various impacts that a higher population density
has on the well-being of people.
Plugging the equilibrium values of Sr, wr and UCr into (11) for a given intercity distribution
of rms and workers, the welfare function is given by
Wm() = LS

1 + (1  )LS2 + L(w1   UC1) + (1  )L(w2   UC2) (17)
=
L("oa   "ob)

 (  1) (   o) + (L+ 2)L
2(L+ 1)2
  tL
2
where
o  t
("oa   "ob)
> m
and "oa  2 (L+ 2) =(L + 1)2 and "ob  (2L2 + 5L + 4)=2(L + 1)2. Hence, agglomeration
(dispersion) is welfare-maximizing when  > o ( < o). The formal connection between
the external environmental cost E and the social welfare function Wm is now clear: both are
second-order polynomials in  and the density  governs the sign of their second derivatives.
Let o be the intercity distribution maximizing Wm. The individual utilities being quasi-
linear, interpersonal transfers allow consumers to reach their optimum utility level W (o)=L,
6It is readily veried that qrr(1) + q

rs(1) exceeds q

rr(1=2) + q

rs(1=2).
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which is larger than the equilibrium utility level V (). As a consequence, the market yields
agglomeration when o >  > m, whereas dispersion is socially desirable. Otherwise, the
market outcome and the social optimum are identical. However, this does not mean that a
higher density is always welfare-enhancing. For example, as shown by Figure 3, when  crosses
m from below, the welfare level displays a downward jump.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Observe that both the social welfare Wm and the carbon footprint E are second-degree
polynomials in . In addition, the density  governs the sign of their second derivatives. As
a a result, social welfare and the amount of pollutants may be convex or concave functions of
 meaning that making cities more compact may or may not increase welfare and/or decrease
pollution. Since o exceeds m, two cases may arise:
(i) When commuting costs are low (t < t), our results imply that an increasing-population
density policy should be accompanied by a growth control policy. Indeed, the polluting emis-
sions in the global economy increases when  crosses m from below and takes a value in
[m; o] (see Figure 2b). In this case, by preventing the agglomeration of activities, the public
authorities both reduce the GHG emissions and improve global welfare.
(ii) When commuting costs are high (t > t), the desirability of a growth control policy is
more controversial. When  crosses m from below and takes a value in [m; o], such a policy
yields higher welfare but washes out the environmental gains generated by the market (see
Figure 2a). This is not, however, the end of the story. The conict between the environmental
and welfare criteria vanishes when  > o because the market outcome both minimizes GHG
emissions and maximizes social welfare.
To summarize,
Proposition 4 Assume that cities are monocentric. If commuting costs are low, a higher
population density may be harmful to both the environment and social welfare when the economy
switches from dispersion to agglomeration. If commuting costs are high, a higher population
density reduces pollution but may generate a welfare loss.
This proposition is su¢ cient to show that the desirability of compact cities is more complex
than suggested by their proponents, the main reason being that this recommendation disregards
its impact on the location of economic activity.
4 The urban system and the environment
So far, we have treated the morphology of cities as given. In this section, we provide the
ecological and welfare evaluation of the market outcome when the size and structure of each
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city are endogenously determined. To reach our goal, we build on Cavailhès et al. (2007).
Having done this, we show once more the possible perverse e¤ects of city compactness and
highlight the positive e¤ects of job decentralization. Specically, we argue that an alternative
strategy could reduce the pollution emissions in the global economy: public authorities control
the intra-urban distribution of rms and workers to decrease the average distance traveled by
workers.
4.1 The size and structure of cities
In what follows, we determine the conditions for a city to become polycentric and, then, study
how raising population density shapes the urban system.
1. The city structure. Firms are free to locate in the CBD or to form a secondary business
district (SBD) on each side of the CBD, thus implying that a polycentric city has one CBD
and two SBDs. Both the CBD and the SBDs are surrounded by residential areas occupied
by workers. Although rms consume services supplied in the SBD, the higher-order functions
(specic local public goods and non-tradeable business-to-business services) are still provided by
the CBD. Hence, for using such services, rms established in a SBDmust incur a communication
cost K > 0. Communicating requires the acquisition of specic facilities, which explains why
communication costs have a xed component. Furthermore, as the distance between the CBD
and SBDs is small compared to the intercity distance, shipping the manufactured good between
the CBD and SBDs is assumed to be costless, which implies that the price of this good is the
same everywhere within a city. Finally, without signicant loss of generality, we restrict ourselves
to the case of two SBDs. Hence, apart from the assumed existence of the CBD, the internal
structure of each city is endogenous. Note that the equilibrium distribution of workers within
cities depends on the distribution of workers between cities. In what follows, the superscript c
is used to describe variables related to the CBD, whereas s describes the variables associated
with a SBD.
At a city equilibrium, each worker maximizes her utility subject to her budget constraint,
each rm maximizes its prots, and markets clear. Individuals choose their workplace (CBD
or SBD) and their residential location for given wages and land rents. Given equilibrium wages
and the location of workers, rms choose to locate either in the CBD or in a SBD. Or, to put
it di¤erently, no rm has an incentive to change place within the city, and no worker wants to
change her working place and residence. In particular, at the city equilibrium, the distribution
of workers is such that V cr () = V
s
r ()  Vr(). Likewise, rms are distributed at the city
equilibrium such that cr() = 
s
r().
Denote by yr the right endpoint of the area formed by residents working in the CBD and
by zr the right endpoint of the residential area on the right-hand side of the SBD, which is
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also the outer limit of city r. Let xsr be the center of the SBD in city r. Therefore, the critical
points for city r are as follows:
yr =
rLr
2
xsr =
(1 + r)Lr
4
zr =
Lr
2
(18)
where r < 1 is the share of city r-rms located in the CBD. Observe that the bid rents at yr
and zr are equal to zero because the lot size is xed and the opportunity cost of land is zero.
At the city equilibrium, the budget constraint implies that
wcr  Rcr(x)=   tx = wsr  Rsr(x)=   t jx  xsrj
where Rcr and R
s
r denote the land rent around the CBD and the SBD, respectively. Moreover,
the worker living at yr is indi¤erent between working in the CBD or in the SBD, which implies
wcr  Rcr(yr)=   tyr = wsr  Rsr(yr)=   t(xsr   yr):
It then follows from Rcr(yr) = R
s
r(yr) = 0 that
wcr   wsr = t(2yr   xsr) = t
3r   1
4
Lr (19)
where we have used the expressions of yr and xsr given in (18).
In each workplace (CBD or SBD), the equilibrium wages are determined by the zero-prot
condition. As a result, the equilibrium wage rates in the CBD and in the SBD must satisfy the
conditions cr(w
c
r; w
s
r) = 
s
r(w
c
r; w
s
r) = 0. Solving these expressions for w
c
r and w
s
r, we get:
wcr = 

r w
s
r = 

r  K (20)
which shows that the wage wedge wcr   wsr is positive.
Finally, the equilibrium land rent in the area occupied by the CBD-workers is given by
Rr(x) = R
c
r(x) = t

rLr
2
  x

for x < yr (21)
where we have used the expression of yr and the condition RC(yr) = 0, while the equilibrium
land rent in the area occupied by the SBD-workers is as follows:7
Rr(x) = R
s
r(x) = t

(1  r)Lr
4
+ xsr   x

for xsr < x < zr: (22)
Substituting (10) and (20) into (19) and solving with respect to  yields:
r = min

1
3
+
4K
3tLr
; 1

(23)
7In this expression, we do not account for the fact that transport modes may not be the same in these
di¤erent areas of the metropolis. Our results remain valid as long as individual worktrips to a SBD do not
generate much higher pollutants than those to the CBD.
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which always exceeds 1=3: the CBD is always larger than each SBD. It is readily veried that
city r is polycentric (r < 1) if and only if
 < r  tLr
2K
: (24)
Observe also that, when r < 1, a larger population Lr leads to a decrease in the relative
size of the CBD, though its absolute size rises, whereas both the relative and absolute sizes of
the SBDs rise. Indeed, increasing rL leads to a more than proportionate hike in the wage rate
prevailing in the CBD because of the rise in the average commuting cost (see (19)). Moreover,
because r < 1, the higher the city compactness, the larger the CBD; the lower the commuting
cost, the larger the CBD. In short, when city compactness steadily rises, both SBDs shrink
smoothly and, eventually, the city becomes monocentric.
2. The urban system. The utility di¤erential between cities now depends on the degree of
job decentralization within each city. The indirect utility of an individual working in the CBD
is still given by (11) in which the urban costs she bears are now given by8
UCcr  r
tLr
2
< UCr:
It follows from (24) that
1  Lt
2K
2  (1  )Lt
2K
(25)
where 1  2 because we focus on the domain   1=2. The following three patterns may
emerge: (i) when  > 1, both cities are monocentric (

1 = 

2 = 1), (ii) when 1 >  > 2,
city 1 is polycentric and city 2 is monocentric (1 < 

2 = 1) (iii) when 2 > , both cities are
polycentric (r < 1).
In order to determine the equilibrium outcome, we must consider the utility di¤erential cor-
responding to each of these three patterns. In Appendix D, we show the existence and stability
of ve equilibrium congurations: (i) dispersion with two monocentric cities having the same
size (m;m); (ii) agglomeration within a single monocentric city (m; 0);(iii) partial agglomera-
tion with one large polycentric city and a small monocentric city (p;m); (iv) agglomeration
within a single polycentric city (p; 0) and (v) dispersion with two polycentric cities having the
same size (p; p): In Figure 4, the domains of the positive quadrant (K; ) in which each of these
congurations is a market outcome are depicted.
Insert Figure 4 about here
The implications of city compactness depend on the level of communication costs. We focus
here on the today relevant case of low communication costs (see Appendix D), i.e.
K < K  L("a   "b)
4
:
8We may disregard the case of SBD-workers because, at the city equilibrium, they reach the same utility
level as the CBD-workers.
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In this event, the economy traces out the following path when the population density  steadily
increases from very small to very large values: we have (p; p) or (p;m) when  < m=3, then
(p;m) when m=3 <  < pm, further (p; 0) when pm <  < 2p with p  Lt=4K (see
Appendix D for more details) and (m; 0) when 2p < , with
pm  t
3("a   "b)   4K=L
which is positive because K < K. This may be explained as follows. By inducing high urban
costs, a low -value leads to both the dispersion and decentralization of jobs, that is, the
emergence of two polycentric cities. When citiespopulation density gets higher, urban costs
decrease su¢ ciently for the centralization of jobs within one city to become the equilibrium
outcome; however, they remain high enough for the equilibrium to involve two cities of di¤erent
sizes and structures. Last, for very high -values, urban costs become almost negligible, thus
allowing one to save the cost of shipping the manufactured good through the emergence of a
single city.
4.2 How the structure and size of cities impact on the environment?
We now determine whether more compact cities lead to lower GHG emissions when rms and
workers are free to locate between and within cities.
The total level of emissions of GHG corresponding to the spatial structure (; 1; 

2) is
given by
E(; 1; 

2) = eCC(
; 1; 

2) + eTT (
):
Note rst that the value of T is still given by (15) because it does not depend on the city
structure. In contrast, the total distance travelled by commuters depends on the internal
structure of each city (1 and 2) as well as on the distribution of workers/rms between cities:
C(; 1; 2) =
2L2
4

21 +
1
2
(1  1)2

+
(1  )2L2
4

22 +
1
2
(1  2)2

(26)
which boils down to (14) when the two cities are monocentric (1 = 2 = 1). It is straightforward
to check that the GHG emissions increase when the CBDs grow. However, the strength of this
e¤ect decreases when cities become more compact.
For any given , the expression (26) shows that the decentralization of jobs away from
the CBD leads to less GHG emissions through a shorter average commuting. Regarding the
impact of a higher population density, it is a priori ambiguous. Indeed, for a given degree
of job decentralization, a higher population density induces shorter commuting distances and,
therefore, lower emissions. However, (23) shows that a rising  also leads to a higher number of
jobs in the CBD at the expense of the SBDs, which increases the emission of GHG. Plugging
(23) into (26), we readily verify that the former e¤ect dominates the latter. Thus, for any
given , more compact cities always generate lower GHG emissions once the city equilibrium
is reached. However, this result may be reverse once workers/rms can relocate between cities.
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(i) Commuting. In order to disentangle the various e¤ects at work, we begin by focusing
on pollution stemming from commuting. For any given location pattern, a higher  leads to
a lower level of pollution. However, the impact of such a change in population density on the
total distance travelled by commuters is not clear when rms and workers may change places
within and between cities. In addition, one may wonder what happens when the economy shifts
from one pattern to another.
To illustrate, we assume that the initial market outcome is given by (p; p). The correspond-
ing GHG emissions generated by commuting are then given by
Cpp  

L2
242
+
4K2
3t2

:
As long as this urban conguration prevails, a higher population density reduces commuting
pollution.9 However, once  crosses m=3 from below, the economy shifts to the conguration
(p;m) (see Figure 4). At  = m=3, the level of pollution exhibits an upward jump.10 This is
because city 1, which remains polycentric, becomes larger while city 2, which now accommodates
fewer workers, becomes monocentric.
At the equilibrium conguration (p;m), pm increases with  whenever K < K.
11 In this
case, (23) and (26) show that the level of pollution Cpm unambiguously decreases with .
However, at  = pm, the economy moves from (p;m) to (p; 0), which implies that the level of
GHG emissions due to commuting is given by
Cpo = 

L2
122
+
2K2
3t2

:
Once more, a change in the intercity structure generates an upward jump in commuting
pollution.12
When  keeps rising, the CBD grows at the expense of the SBDs. Under these circum-
stances, Cpo decreases for  <
p
2p but increases when  rises from
p
2p to 2p. Because jobs
relocate in the CBD at the expense of the SBDs in response to higher population density, the
average distance traveled by commuters may increase. This result might come as something
of a surprise because it says that making a polycentric city more compact need not be good
for the environment, even when the city remains polycentric. We are thus far from the famous
compact is always better.
Finally, when  reaches the threshold 2p, the SBDs vanish, meaning that city 1 becomes
monocentric. At  = 2p, we have Cpo = Cmo where
Cmo =
L2
4
:
9Indeed, dCpp=d < 0 if and only if   p=
p
2. Because p=
p
2 > m=3 when K < K, we have dCpp=d < 0
as long as the economy involves two identical polycentric cities ( < m=3).
10Indeed, we have Cpp < Cpm when   m=3.
11The value of pm can be determined from case (iii) in the Appendix B by solving pmV () = 0.
12This is because Cpm < Cpo over the interval m=3    pm.
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In this case, increasing further the population density leads to lower pollution.
The entire equilibrium path is described in Figure 5. It reveals an interesting and new
result: although increasing the population density is likely to reduce GHG emissions when the
city size remains unchanged, the resulting change in urban structure might well raise the GHG
emissions stemming from commuting. In particular, because the minimum value of Cpm over
(m=3; pm) exceeds the maximum value of Cpp over (p; m=3), moving from (p; p) to (p; 0)
through (p;m) leads to higher levels of commuting pollution. In other words, by a¤ecting the
urban system, a higher population density may have undesirable e¤ects from the environmental
viewpoint.
Insert Figure 5 about here
(ii) Shipping. Consider now GHG emissions generated by the transport of goods. Dis-
persion ( = 1=2) is the worst and agglomeration ( = 1) the best conguration: T (1=2) >
T (pm) > T (1). Consequently, for K < K, the recommendations based on commuting (C)
and interregional shipping (T ) do not point to the same direction. Specically, when the city
structure shifts from (p,m) to (p,0), the pollution generated by workerscommuting jumps up-
ward, whereas the pollution stemming from shipping goods vanishes. In this event, it is a priori
impossible to compare the various market outcomes, hence to determine the best ecological
conguration. Yet, given the relative importance of commuting and other within-city trips in
the global emission of carbon dioxides, we believe that the conclusions derived for the former
case are empirically relevant.
4.3 Welfare and the environment
The above results suggest that the decentralization of jobs within cities should supplement a
higher population density from the ecological standpoint. One may wonder what this recom-
mendation becomes when it is evaluated at the light of a second-best approach in which the
planner chooses the number and structure of cities (o; o1; 
o
2).
At any given intercity distribution of rms (), the intra-urban allocation of rms maximiz-
ing global welfare is given by:
or =
1
3
+
2K
3tLr
< r: (27)
Hence, starting from the market equilibrium (r), a coordinated decentralization of jobs within
cities both raises welfare and decreases GHG emissions. It is readily veried that socially
optimal outcome implies that city r is polycentric if
 < or 
tLr
K
: (28)
Let us now turn to the case where the intercity distribution of activities and the city structure
are both endogenous. As in the foregoing, we restrict ourselves to the case of low communication
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costs (K < K). It is shown in Appendix E that the welfare optimum is given by (i) two
identical polycentric cities when o=3 > , (ii) two asymmetric cities when 
o
pm >  > o=3,
(iii) one single polycentric city when 4p >  > 
o
pm, and (iv) one single monocentric when
 > 4p (the expression of 
o
pm is given in Appendix E). Because o > m and 
o
pm > pm,
the market need not deliver the optimal conguration. For example, the market sustains two
asymmetric cities when o=3 >  > m=3 while the second-best optimum involves two identical
polycentric cities. In addition, when opm >  > o=3, a single polycentric city is the equilibrium
spatial conguration; the second-best optimum is given by a large polycentric city with a small
monocentric city.
Consequently, as in Section 3, when rms and workers locations are given, a marginal
increase in  is always ecologically and socially desirable. However, when the population density
hike generates a new pattern of activities, the move may be detrimental to both objectives.
For instance, when  crosses m=3 from below and takes a value in [m=3; o=3], pollution from
commuting exhibits an upward jump (see Figure 5). Moreover, the market outcome involves
two asymmetric cities (p,m), while the second-best optimum involves two identical polycentric
cities. This shows that what we have seen in Section 3 remains valid when the morphology
of the urban system is endogenous. Though incomplete, our analysis suggests that there is no
systematic conict between welfare and environmental objectives.
5 Conclusion
This paper has focused on a single facet of compact cities: the transport demand. Observe,
however, that trips related to activities such as recreation and schooling have a less direct rela-
tion to the city structure than commuting, thus blurring the connection between compactness
and GHG emissions. Our model, therefore, should be extended to account for the location of
such facilities. Furthermore, we have left aside the role of population density in the emissions
of carbon dioxides generated by home heating and air conditioning. For example, residential
energy use accounts for another 20% of Americas GHG emissions. Therefore, a housing sector
should be grafted onto our setting to capture this additional facet of the problem. In the same
vein, it should be recognized that high population densities generate congestion and other neg-
ative externalities that are likely to clash with the social norms prevailing in many developed
countries. Another limit of our approach is the implicit assumption of liquid housingin that
the population density may be increased at no cost. Accounting for adjustment costs in housing
size would make the case for compact cities weaker. Finally, our planning approach should be
compared to a decentralized mechanism in which cities are free to choose their land-use policies.
Due to the lack of coordination between jurisdictions, one may expect more tension to occur
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between the ecological and social welfare objectives.13
To sum up, our work is too preliminary for strong and specic policy recommendations. This
work must be viewed as a rst step toward a theory of an ecologically and socially desirable
urban system. We believe, however, that our results are su¢ ciently convincing to encourage city
planners and policy-makers alike to pay more attention to the various implications of urban
compactness. Unless modal changes lead workers to use mass transport systems, compact
and monocentric cities may generate more pollution than an urban system with polycentric
dispersed cities. In addition, by lowering urban costs without reducing markedly the benets
generated by large urban agglomerations, the creation of secondary business centers may allow
large cities to reduce GHG emissions while enjoying agglomeration economies. The future of
China and India, among others, will be urban, and the land-use rules they choose will have
a considerable impact on the world carbon footprint (Glaeser, 2011). Building tall cities is
clearly part of the answer, but we contend that policy-makers should also pay attention to the
structure and number of the megacities that will emerge.
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6 Appendix A
Accounting for emissions stemming from shopping-trips and manufacturing production do not
change the qualitative properties of our fundamental trade-o¤.
- If shopping malls, say, are located at the city outskirts, this means that a consumer located
at x has to travel the distance yr  x = Lr=2  x to go to the mall. If the number of shopping
trips is given by  > 0, C() must be supplemented by
M() = 2
Z y1
0
(y1   x)dx+ 2
Z y2
0
(y2   x)dx = C()
and thus C() + M() = ( + 1)C(). As a result, accounting for shopping trips in (13)
amounts to giving a higher weight to the component capturing the within-city emissions. Of
course, this argument does not account for localized trips, such as those made to schools. As
shown by Glaeser and Kahn, the length of these trips also depends on the density. Their total
length decreases with  but increases with , very much like C.
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- The carbon footprint E of the urban system can be augmented by introducing emissions
stemming from production. The total output is given by
Q1() +Q

2() =
L2
L+ 1
[1  2(1  )]:
Thus, production behaves like C and is minimized (maximized) when  = 1=2 ( = 1). It
suggests that accounting for production in the carbon footprint of cities makes the case for
dispersion stronger.
Appendix B
To see how things work, assume that f(x) = 1   kx with k < =L (hence, regardless the city
size, we have 1  kyr > 0). The meaning of  is as before while a low value of k means that the
distribution is dispersed; it is uniform when k = 0.
The right endpoint of city r is now such thatZ yr
0
(1  kx)dx = Lr
2
the solution of which is
yr =
1 p1  kLr=
k
:
It is readily veried that dyr=dLr > 0 and d2yr=dL2r > 0 as well as dyr=d < 0 and dyr=dk > 0.
In other words, the spatial extension of city r increases with its population size and decreases
with its population density, that is, a higher  and a smaller k. Note also that yr = Lr=2 when
k = 0.
The urban costs are now given by
UCr =
t
k

1 
p
1  kLr=

while the equilibrium wages and surplus are not a¤ected by k. Standard calculations show that
full agglomeration arises if and only if
m <
kL
2

1 p1  kL=  
A
and full dispersion if and only if
m > 
r
1  kL
2
 
D:
Note that 
D = 
A =  when k = 0. In addition, since k < =L we have 
D > 
A. As a
consequence, we have full dispersion when  < Dm where 
D
m is the solution to 
D() = m with
Dm = max

kL+
q
k2L2 + 162m

=4; kL

;
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partial agglomeration when Am >  > 
D
m where 
A
m is the solution to 
A() = m with
Am = 4
2
m=(4m   kL);
and full agglomeration when  > Am. It is straightforward to check that 
A
m = 
D
m = m when
k = 0. In addition, we have Am = 
D
m = 0 when t = 0 and 
A
m !1 and Dm !1 when t!1.
In the case of partial agglomeration, the spatial equilibrium is given by
 =
1
2
+
2m
p

D   m
Lk
:
The sum of distance traveled by workers is now given by
C() = 2
X
r
Z yr
0
x(   kx)dx =

1
2
  kyr
3

y2r :
This function reaches its minimum at  = 1=2 while C() = L2r=4 when k = 0. It is straight-
forward to check that E is minimized at
e =
1
2
+
eC
eT
p
Y
kLZ
where
Y  1  Lk
2
  e
2
C
4e2T 
2Z2
Z  [2  (L+ 2)]=(L+ 1):
It is readily veried that e = 1=2 (e = 1) if and only if  is su¢ ciently small (large),
whereas e belongs to the interval (1=2; 1) for intermediate values of . Consequently, the
positive quadrant of the (t; )-space is now divided into several domains in which the market
delivers either a good or a bad ecological outcome, very much as in the case of uniform densities.
This is illustrated in Figure 1b where the market outcome minimizes pollution in Panels A and
C while in panels B, Dand E, the market delivers a bad ecological outcome.
Figure 1b
Appendix C
When cities can be monocentric or polycentric, the welfare function becomes
W (1; 2; ) = LS

1 + L2S

2 + 1L(w
C
1   UCC1 ) + 2 (1  )L(wC2   UCC2 )
+ (1  1)L(wS1   UCS1 ) + (1  2) (1  )L
 
wS2   UCS2

:
Plugging (27) into this expression, we get the following cases.
(i) If  > o1 where 
o
1 is given by (28), both cities must be monocentric and the social
optimum is given by the maximizer of (17).
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(ii) If o1 >  > 
o
2, city 1 must be polycentric and city 2 must be monocentric, which implies
that W is given by
Wpm() 

("oa   "ob)  
2t
3

2L 

("oa   "ob)  
t

+
2K
3L

L
+
(L+ 2)L
2(L+ 1)2
  tL
2
+
K2
3tL
:
The social optimum now involves an interior conguration (opm) when  < 2
o
m=3 and  < 
o
pm
with
opm 
t
3("oa   "0b)   2K=L
:
Note thatWm(1=2) = Wpm(
o
pm) at  = 2
o
m=3, whereasWpm(
o
pm) < Wm(1=2) when  < 2
o
m=3.
(iii) If o2 > , both cities are polycentric. Social welfare is thus given by
Wpp() =
3L("oa   "ob)

 (  1) (   om=3) 
2KL+ L2t
6
.
Accordingly, dispersion maximizes social welfare when  < om=3. Note that Wpp(1=2) =
Wpm(
o
pm) at  = 
o
m and Wp(1=2) > Wpm(
o
pm) when  < 
o
m.
If dispersion ( = 1=2) is socially desirable from the welfare viewpoint, we have o1 = 
o
2 = 2p
so that the two cities must be monocentric if  > 2p and polycentric if  < 2p. Similarly, under
agglomeration ( = 1), o1 = 4p while 
o
2 = 0. Thus, agglomeration arises as a monocentric
city when  > 4p or as a polycentric city when  < 4p. Last, 
o
1 >  > 
o
2 holds if and only
if 1=2 < o < 1. Consequently, welfare is maximized when the economy is characterized by (i)
a single monocentric city if  > maxfom; 4pg; (ii) a single polycentric city if opm <  < 4p;
(iii) two identical monocentric cities if 2p <  < 
0
m; (iv) two identical polycentric cities if
 < min fom=3; 2pg; (v) one large polycentric city and one small monocentric city if om=3 <
 < minf2p; opmg.
Appendix D
Under dispersion ( = 1=2), we have 1 = 2 = p where
p  Lt=4K
so that the two cities are monocentric if  > p and polycentric if  < p. Similarly, under
agglomeration ( = 1), 1 = 2p while 2 = 0. Thus, agglomeration arises within a monocentric
city when  > 2p or within a polycentric city when  < 2p. Last, 1 >  > 2 holds if and
only if 1=2 <  < 1.
Case (i). Dispersion with two monocentric cities.
When  < m, Proposition 1 implies that  = 1=2 is an equilibrium outcome once we restrict
ourselves to monocentric cities. Note further that the condition  > p also prevents a marginal
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deviation to a polycentric city to occur because, in the neighborhood of  = 1=2, city r remains
monocentric. Hence, the market equilibrium involves two monocentric cities having the same
size if and only if p <  < m. For such a conguration to arise, it must be that p < m, i.e.
K > K with:
K  L ("a   "b) 
4
:
Case (ii). Agglomeration within a single monocentric city.
Consider now the case of agglomeration in a monocentric city ( = 1). For this to arise, it
must be that  > 2p. In this case, when some workers leave city 2 to city 1, the latter must
be monocentric. Because V (1) > 0 when  > m, 
 = 1 is a stable equilibrium if and only if
 > m and  > 2p.
Case (iii). Dispersion with one polycentric city and one monocentric city.
When 1 >  > 2, the utility di¤erential with 

1 < 1 and 

2 = 1 is given by
pmV ()  2

("a   "b)   2t
3

+

 ("a   "b) + t

  4K
3L

:
Because pmV () is linear in , the equilibrium 1=2 < 

pm < 1 is stable if and only if
pmV (1=2) > 0 and pmV (1) < 0 hold. The rst condition is equivalent to  < p whereas the
second condition amounts to  < pm.
Case (iv). Agglomeration within a single polycentric city.
Agglomeration ( = 1) in the polycentric city occurs if and only if pm <  < 2p. Note that
pm < 2p if and only if K < 2 K, which holds when communication costs are low, transport
costs are high, or both. Otherwise, even though agglomeration in a monocentric city remains
a possible outcome, agglomeration in a polycentric city is not an equilibrium.
Case (v). Dispersion with two polycentric cities.
When  < 2, the corresponding utility di¤erential, which requires 

1 < 1 and 

2 < 1, is
given by
ppV ()  L("a   "b)


   m
3

  1
2

: (D.1)
Dispersion with two polycentric cities is an equilibrium if  < 2, which becomes  < p when
 = 1=2. It remains to show that this conguration is stable. First, it must that the coe¢ cient
of  is negative in (D.1), which amounts to  < m=3. Second, this conguration is stable
against a marginal deviation to a monocentric city in, say, city 2 because, in the neighborhood
of  = 1=2, city 2 is polycentric because  < p. Therefore, the dispersed conguration with
two polycentric cities is a stable equilibrium if and only if  < m=3 and  < p.
These results are summarized as follows. There exist ve stable spatial congurations: (i)
a single monocentric city when  > maxfm; 2pg; (ii) a single polycentric city when pm <  <
2p; (iii) two identical monocentric cities when p <  < m; (iv) two identical polycentric cities
when  < min fm=3; pg; (v) one large polycentric city and one small monocentric city when
 < minfp; pmg.
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Appendix E
When cities can be monocentric or polycentric the second best allocation is the solution of the
following program:
Max W (1; 2; ) = L1S1 + L2S

2 + 1L1(w
c
1   UCc1) + 2L2(wc2   UCc2)
+ (1  1)L1(ws1   UCs1) + (1  2)L2 (ws2   UCs2) :
Plugging (27) into this expression, we get:
(i) if  > o1 where 
o
1 is given by (28), both cities must be monocentric and the social
optimum is given by the solution to (17);
(ii) if o1 >  > 
o
2, city 1 must be polycentric and city 2 must be monocentric, which implies
that W is given by
Wpm() 

("o2   "o1)  
2t
3

2L 

("o2   "o1)  
t

+
2K
3L

L
+
(L+ 2)L
2(L+ 1)2
  tL
2
+
K2
3tL
:
The optimum now involves an interior conguration (opm) when  < 2
o
m=3 and  < 
o
pm with
opm 
t
3("o2   "01)   2K=L
:
Note thatWm(1=2) = Wpm(
o
pm) at  = 2
o
m=3, whereasWpm(
o
pm) < Wm(1=2) when  < 2
o
m=3.
(iii) if o2 > , both cities must be polycentric, so that W is now given by
Wp =
3L("o2   "o1)

 (  1) (   om=3) 
2KL+ L2t
6
Accordingly, dispersion maximizes social welfare when  < om=3. Note that Wp(1=2) =
Wpm(
o
pm) at  = 
o
m and Wp(1=2) > Wpm(
o
pm) when  < 
o
m.
If dispersion ( = 1=2) is socially desirable from the welfare viewpoint, we have o1 = 
o
2 = 2p
so that the two cities must be monocentric if  > 2p and polycentric if  < 2p. Similarly,
under agglomeration ( = 1), o1 = 4p while 
o
2 = 0. Thus, agglomeration must arise within a
monocentric city when  > 4p or within a polycentric city when  < 4p. Last, 
o
1 >  > 
o
2
holds if and only if 1=2 < o < 1. Consequently, welfare is maximized when the economy is
characterized by (i) a single monocentric city when  > maxfom; 4pg; (ii) a single polycentric
city when opm <  < 4p; (iii) two identical monocentric cities when 2p <  < 
0
m; (iv) two
identical polycentric cities when  < min fom=3; 2pg; (v) one large polycentric city and one
small monocentric city when om=3 <  < minf2p; opmg.
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Figure 1. Inter-city distribution and ecological outcome with monocentric cities 
 
 
 
Figure 1bis. Inter-city distribution and ecological outcome with non-uniform density 
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Figure 2a. Ecological and market outcomes when t t  
 
 
 
Figure 2b. Ecological and market outcomes when t t  
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Figure 4. The set of equilibria 
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